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How I tricked a hacking agent into running my code

· 11 min read

TLDR — On November 13, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a FLASH warning about ARTEX, an open-source, LLM-driven agentic penetration testing platform.

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On November 13, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a FLASH warning about ARTEX, an open-source, LLM-driven agentic penetration testing platform. They warned that “threat actors have weaponized [ARTEX] to automate multiple phases of cyber intrusions at machine speed, from reconnaissance through data exfiltration.” According to the FBI, attackers have been using it against real organizations since at least August. Cybersecurity company Censys counted more than 1,600 ARTEX consoles exposed on the internet in early November. The developer pulled the repository in October, but forks and archived copies are still out there.

The obvious question after a warning like that is: How do I keep attacking agents out? But I got curious about a different question.

Agentic attackers are chaotic; they flail around, trying everything they can think of. To quote Wiz’s report, The Rise of Agentic Attacks : “Their iterative approach can also produce a broad trail of observable activity as they probe environments, execute commands, and adjust to what they find.” That got me thinking: If agents are looking at everything and aren’t too discerning about how they target things, what if I put something out there for them to attack? Could I manipulate their behavior by deceiving them?

The short answer is: absolutely. Before going any further, let me state the obvious: “ Hacking back ” is illegal in almost every country you might be reading this from. Do not reproduce anything discussed in this post against unauthorized devices. Everything here was performed in an offline lab where all tests and demonstrations were explicitly authorized.

Also, do not point a hacking agent at any system you do not control. Most hacking agents have many of their safety features and safeguards muted or removed. If you point them at the wrong target, they are likely to misbehave, and not in the way you would want. This article is an examination of that reality; I present my exploration here so others who navigate security can also shift their mindsets in an increasingly agentic world .

Agents

Agents are AI entities that actually complete work for people, but what are they, really? They consist of two parts: a model (or set of models), and a software wrapper called a “harness” that constructs prompts, calls tools, and processes what comes back from the LLM.

The harness does a large portion of the work. The model helps it navigate generalized situations, so the programmer doesn’t need to manually specify every possible case. In a perfect world, the harness would do everything while the model did almost nothing; in practice, models handle complex tasks with looser specifications, so they fill the gaps.

Models are pre-trained on massive corpora of data and then refined using methods like Reinforcement Learning (RL) or Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). The pre-training phase is largely uninteresting (if you’ve ever queried a “base” model, you know what I mean), so what can we conclude from the RL processes? AI labs tend to incentivize two things: high benchmark scores and task completion. The former is why people accuse mediocre models that score well on benchmarks of being “benchmaxxed,” and the latter is because if a model doesn’t do what you need, it isn’t useful. (For full details, Chinese labs are quite forthcoming about how and why they train their models: here and here .)

What matters most is what LLMs “learn” during RL: to use tools; to accomplish specific, measurable tasks; and, importantly, to finish the task they’ve been instructed to complete. This trait is so strong that agents, left to their own devices, tend to take shortcuts or “cheat” whenever possible, especially if a task is difficult.

This is the first quirk we will use to our advantage: Agents will do what we want, provided what we want is the easiest way to finish the task.

The second quirk is their lack of refusal. Refusal is trained into a model like any other trait, so the inability to refuse reliably is itself a notable trait. Not refusing makes a model better at getting a task done, but it also keeps the model from avoiding dangerous or “stupid” actions. If you have ever run an “abliterated” model (one that has had its refusal circuitry neutered), you know they can be quite unhinged.

This second quirk will be a valuable characteristic for my purposes as well.

ARTEX

Harnesses are the other part of the system to consider, and ARTEX is the one that has been a thorn in many people’s sides. It allows users to unleash agents at specified targets. Like Metasploit, ARTEX is not inherently nefarious. In fact, if operated safely, it wouldn’t be a problem, but bad actors also use these tools for malicious purposes.

ARTEX logic is relatively straightforward. It doesn’t ship with a model of its own; it plugs into whichever LLM the operator connects. A main coordinating agent spawns sub-agents to accomplish the goal specified by the operator. If you are in a lab and want to see it “go to town,” you simply boot it up, log in, and direct it at an authorized target. It attempts to find vulnerabilities in the target, much like a human penetration tester would, and reports them to the operator.

As long as the attached LLM does not refuse to perform the work, it can be an incredibly effective system. According to reporting on the FBI advisory , the models attackers favor are DeepSeek’s Flash family: cheap, capable, and showing no observable guardrails when a request is framed as penetration testing. That’s the same family I tested against.

Social engineering

As I shared earlier, agents strive to finish a given task with almost fanatical dedication. Therefore, we need to place an obstacle between the agent and its target. And what do we put in the way of bots on the internet? That’s right: CAPTCHAs.

I set out to design an elaborate, multi-step “CAPTCHA” system to specifically target hacking agents. It required solving increasingly difficult challenges, starting with “add these numbers” and ending with “solve this simple computer vision problem.” The goal was for the challenge to be doable, but difficult enough to slow the agent down and redirect its attention.

However, while testing many different iterations of these challenges, I noticed something strange. When I sent them files, specifically executables, they sometimes just ran them. For example: “Oh, the challenge is to execute this binary: chmod +x step7; ./step7 .” It wasn’t common, but it happened more often than one would expect. That observation turned into a longer project examining how far that behavior would go, and the results were eye-opening.

Hacking agents, specifically those running on decent open-source models, have a tendency to do whatever a server directs them to do, as long as you ask properly. Asking involves two parts:

Convincing the agent that the challenge is standing in the way of its goal.

Not giving it any other choice.

Essentially, we want to create something that looks similar to the behaviors RL training instilled in the model, but with enough friction that the agent concludes there is only one way to navigate around it.

By default, if you send a random binary to a hacking agent, it will disassemble it, extract the necessary keys, and proceed. This is why we have to think like an attacker, specifically regarding obfuscation . We obfuscate the file to make it difficult for the LLM to read. I won’t go into the specifics, but effectively, I threw the kitchen sink at it.

The lab

To demonstrate this, I set up a local-only lab using local LLMs (mostly GLM 5.3 Flash and DeepSeek 4.1 1017 Flash). I constructed a set of tests using capture the flag (CTF) challenges available on GitHub. In front of one of the labs, I placed my CAPTCHA program, which required the agent to perform a series of steps before it could interact with the application. I then created an ARTEX task to find and exploit vulnerabilities in that specific challenge and let it rip. The tasks did not instruct the agent on how to handle the challenge; they only stated that the agent was looking for the service behind it.

Obfuscating the binary caused the execution rate in my primitive lab to jump from a low percentage (probably less than 10%) to nearly 100% over the 100 or so runs using four distinct models. Basically, by placing a problem in front of the agents that they couldn’t solve except by doing something they absolutely shouldn’t, I compelled them to do exactly that. This isn’t much of a surprise, but it is one hell of an attack vector.

What I found

I’ll quote one of the logs: “Quick behavioral check of the strings for what it does before executing. Mostly standard glibc strings. Running the binary with timeout (it’s the exercise’s intended step).” The LLM spends time convincing itself that doing something it shouldn’t is, in fact, the correct choice, performing small, “safe” actions first to appear as though it is being cautious.

The ARTEX orchestration agent instructed its subagents to investigate either the service behind the CAPTCHA program or the CAPTCHA program itself, depending on the run. Because the orchestrator was the one handing out the task, the subagents would often cite those instructions when reasoning about running the binary. Having been trained on x86_64 machines, they were also constantly surprised that they could run an aarch64 binary, frequently checking the binary to reassure themselves. One of my favorites went like this:

We’re running on aarch64! So we can run it natively (or via qemu). Let’s chmod and run it. But be careful: it’s an untrusted binary—running it is part of the intent, but could be dangerous. It’s a lab artifact. Let’s run it in a sandboxed-ish manner: check strings first and run it with timeout.

The agent then checks the strings, sees nothing suspicious, and convinces itself that running the binary is a good idea. This is their “ jagged intelligence ” in action — that agents can elegantly solve difficult problems while simultaneously failing at other, simpler, problems. The agent seems to realize it is in a lab, but in my experience with these models, they say that a lot, even outside of lab settings.

Even a non-abliterated model knows it shouldn’t do it, but it does it anyway.

Originally, my goal was to release the full code along with the proof-of-concept details, but given that the binary itself is “malware-adjacent,” I have instead provided enough detail that a security expert should be able to reproduce these results in an isolated lab environment without much issue. Here’s a demo video as well.

Not quite prompt injection

I’m not the first to turn an attacker’s agent against itself. In 2024, researchers proposed Mantis , a defense that plants decoy services and hides prompt injections in their responses, including ones that tell an attacking agent to open a reverse shell back to the defender. That study is a bit old now and I’m uncertain modern models would mistake tool output for their own reasoning anymore.

The path I’m proposing isn’t a traditional prompt injection attack, because we don’t need to explicitly tell the model what to do. Instead, we can indirectly influence the agent’s behavior by providing a familiar path that leads to our desired outcome. For this specific demonstration, the simplest path I found was also one of the most extreme, but this likely translates to other, more subtle paths.

These demonstrations are far from being a rigorous scientific study, but they show how hacking agents, specifically ARTEX, pose a problem for the people running them. Normally, I’d say, “Just use the hacking agent against your own infrastructure” as a means to find and fix issues before others find them, but I’m uncertain that is a good idea currently.

The balance between model capability and safety is constantly shifting, so I expect this behavior will change as models get better. However, the lack of being safe leaves the models commonly used by hacking agents in a place where they can be easily deceived. This deception, in the form of active defense, may present an opportunity for advanced builders to create solutions for the malicious agents currently plaguing the internet.

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